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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
 As former consular officers with decades of 
experience working for the Department of State, 
Amici Bushra A. Malik, Robert A. Mautino, Stephen 
R. Pattison, William R. Rosner, Peter van Buren, and 
Micah Watson have extensive expertise in visa appli-
cation processing and in exercising discretion to fulfill 
that task.1 Aside from work at Foggy Bottom head-
quarters in Washington, D.C., Amici’s postings 
abroad include Accra, Ghana; Bangkok, Thailand; 
Beirut, Lebanon; Berlin, Germany; Brussels, Bel-
gium; Bucharest, Romania; Colombo, Sri Lanka; 
Guadalajara, Mexico; Helsinki, Finland; Hong Kong, 
People’s Republic of China; London, United Kingdom; 
Osaka, Japan; Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Seoul, 
South Korea; Taipei, Taiwan; Tijuana, Mexico; and 
Tokyo, Japan. 
 Consular officers are defined in relevant part by 
the Immigration and Nationality Act as “any consu-
lar, diplomatic, or other officer or employee of the 
United States designated . . . for the purpose of 
issuing immigrant or nonimmigrant visas.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(9). During their public service, Amici were 
collectively responsible for assessing tens of thousands 
 
 1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, Amici 
state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or 
in part and that no person other than Amici or their counsel 
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. 
The parties’ letters consenting to the filing of this brief have 
been filed with the Clerk. 
2 
of visa applications, as line consular officers and in 
supervisory capacities. Now, as then, they are inter-
ested in maximizing the accuracy and fairness of 
weighty decisions about whom to admit to the United 
States, particularly when U.S. citizens’ family reuni-
fication is at stake. They submit this brief to clarify 
the role that consular officers and other government 
actors play in the current visa-security system when 
evaluating visa applications that may implicate 
national security.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Certain visa application denials, particularly 
those based on information originating from agencies 
other than the Department of State, can be qualita-
tively different from denials based on consular discre-
tion. Although the end result looks the same – “Visa 
Denied” – denials based on database and watchlist 
information maintained in the United States by the 
Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and other 
agencies, bear little resemblance to the traditional 
exercise of consular discretion because the specific 
information which requires the consular officer to 
deny these visas is usually not available for him or 
her to evaluate. Real decision-making in these cases 
has in effect been ceded to the database and 
watchlisting process, in which government agents 
other than consular officers affix a label (e.g., “known 
or suspected terrorist”) that is then used as a proxy 
for consular judgment. 
3 
 As a consequence, visa denials that rely on 
database and watchlist information frequently in-
volve no consular discretion and are compelled by 
conclusory statements for which the underlying basis 
is unseen and unevaluated by a consular officer. 
Actions taken by the consular officer who adjudicated 
Mr. Berashk’s visa provide a good example of this 
paradox, as the consular officer’s initial prediction of 
the visa’s speedy approval was made without aware-
ness of what appears to be derogatory information 
about Mr. Berashk contained in a database. Consuls 
do not run mandatory name-checks on applicants 
until after their visa interviews are completed and an 
applicant is found to be eligible, otherwise, for visa 
issuance. The discovery of derogatory information 
against Mr. Berashk appears to have arisen from a 
database, not from the visa interview. Shielding the 
denial of his visa from judicial review, would, there-
fore, erroneously cloak database and watchlist entries 
in the garb of consular discretion. 
 Judicial review should be available for visa 
applications denied on grounds extending beyond 
consular discretion, with appropriate restrictions to 
prevent release of classified information. Judicial 
review is especially appropriate when a U.S. citizen’s 
family unity is at stake.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
   
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. Petitioners’ description of consular visa 
processing must be supplemented to re-
flect the changed nature of modern visa 
security, which requires visa denials 
based on database and watchlist “hits” 
without genuine consular evaluation. 
 Petitioners’ brief presents an anachronistic 
picture of consular visa processing, arguing against 
“revisiting decisions about whether aliens who appear 
before consular officers at far-off posts satisfy the 
conditions Congress has decreed.” Petitioners’ Brief, 
15 (emphasis added); see also id. at 34 (opposing 
“judicial second-guessing of decisions made by consu-
lar officers abroad”) (emphasis added), 40 (describing 
Congress “vest[ing] consular officers with the authori-
ty to make final determinations” about admission 
(emphasis added)). This role description, while ex-
tremely familiar to Amici – capturing, for example, 
how they routinely evaluated particular categories of 
visa applicants for impermissible “immigrant intent” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) – fails to acknowledge that 
many visa denials no longer result from the exercise 
of consular discretion as traditionally envisioned. In-
stead, many visa denials occur because officials at 
other agencies make judgments based on information 
available exclusively to them, which consular officers 
– who themselves had no investigative role or author-
ity to challenge that evidence – are unable to contest. 
 As a description of today’s system of visa applica-
tion processing after the Homeland Security Act of 
5 
2002, the traditional picture is outdated because it 
omits the broad power of actors outside the Depart-
ment of State’s consular corps to control the outcome 
of visa applications. Point II below describes in detail 
the database infrastructure underpinning current 
visa security. Before reaching those particulars, this 
section addresses the statutory framework that 
altered how responsibilities for visa decision-making 
are divided between the Department of State (DOS) 
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
 Prior to the Homeland Security Act, consular 
officers were the lead actors in visa adjudication. See 
Stephen R. Viña, Cong. Research Serv., RL31997, 
Authority to Enforce the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) in the Wake of the Homeland Security Act: 
Legal Issues 1 n.2 (2003) (“The Secretary of State, the 
State Department, and the diplomatic and consular 
officers therein had primary authority for interpret-
ing and implementing [INA] provisions on issuing 
visas overseas, as well as having a role in implement-
ing certain provisions that implicated sensitive 
foreign policy concerns.”). Under the new statutory 
regime, however, “all authorities to . . . administer, 
and enforce the provisions of [the Immigration and 
Nationality] Act and of all other immigration and 
nationality laws, relating to the functions of consular 
officers of the United States in connection with the 
granting or refusal of visas” are now “vested exclu-
sively” with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 6 
U.S.C. § 236(b)(1). The Secretary of State’s residual 
role has been preserved only for individual visa 
6 
“refusal[s] necessary or advisable in the foreign policy 
or security interests of the United States,” 6 U.S.C. 
§ 236(c)(1), as well as for particular foreign policy 
provisions of the INA. See 6 U.S.C. § 236(c)(2) (re-
taining Secretary of State’s extant authorities, e.g., 
determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C)(i) that 
an applicant’s admission poses “potentially serious 
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United 
States”).2 
 Ultimate authority to control the vast majority of 
visa denials therefore no longer rests with consular 
officers, who are employees of the Department of 
State. Rather, it is the Secretary of Homeland Securi-
ty who is vested with the broad “authority to refuse 
visas in accordance with law.” 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1). 
DHS’s authority to deny a visa “is exercised through 
the Secretary of State,” id., and in practice through 
consular officers at posts abroad, but an applicant’s 
visa denial often has little or nothing to do with the 
discretion conferred on consular officers by Con-
gress.  
 
 2 For further elaboration of the post-Homeland Security Act 
division of authorities, see National Immigration Project of the 
National Lawyers Guild, Statutes Related to Visa Eligibility 
(Jan. 6, 2015), available at http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/ 
legalresources/practice_advisories/Visa_Statutes_Chart.pdf; and 
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, 




 In order to implement their dual responsibilities, 
DOS and DHS signed a memorandum of understand-
ing (MOU) in 2003. See Memorandum of Understand-
ing Between the Secretaries of State and Homeland 
Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 11 (Sept. 28, 2003), 
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ 
News_&_Events/ADOS_DHS_MOU_re_HSA.pdf; Ruth 
Ellen Wasem, Cong. Research Serv., R43589, Immi-
gration: Visa Security Policies 17-18 (2014). The MOU 
clarifies that “the Secretary of Homeland Security’s 
authority to direct refusal or revocation of a visa may 
be delegated only to DHS headquarters staff,” adding 
that “[i]f the Secretary of Homeland Security decides 
. . . to refuse a visa . . . [he or she] shall request the 
Secretary of State to instruct the relevant consular 
officer to refuse the visa. . . .” MOU, supra, at 8. 
 The MOU underpins today’s changed nature of 
visa-application processing by, inter alia, implement-
ing the Homeland Security Act’s provision for assign-
ing DHS personnel to diplomatic posts. See Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, § 428(e), 116 Stat. 
2135, 2189-90. Today, there are 20 DHS Visa Security 
Units (VSUs) abroad. See Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
Office of Inspector General, The DHS Visa Security 
Program 3 (2014). One of these VSUs is in Islamabad, 
Pakistan, where Mr. Berashk was interviewed and 
told to expect his visa in two to six weeks. See Wasem, 
supra, at 13. DHS intends to expand its U.S.-based 
Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence 
Operations Team (PATRIOT), which “currently 
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screens visa applicants from the 20 VSU posts . . . to 
screen applications for all 225 visa-issuing posts.” 
DHS Visa Security, supra, at 8, 26. The very name of 
this DHS unit – dedicated to “pre-adjudicated” 
threats – reveals the shift away from traditional 
consular decision-making that the new statutory 
regime accomplished. 
 DHS describes VSU staff as “perform[ing] visa 
security activities, which aim to complement the DOS 
visa screening process with law enforcement re-
sources not available to consular officers.” Wasem, 
supra, at 13 (emphasis added). VSU personnel are 
authorized, “as deemed appropriate by the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, [to] provide the rating and/or 
reviewing officer with input relevant to the evalua-
tion of a consular officer [for mandatory] considera-
tion in preparing the annual employee evaluation 
report.” MOU, supra, at 13. 
 The MOU anticipated disagreements between 
DOS and DHS officials regarding visa denials: 
A DHS employee assigned to an overseas 
post and performing section 428(e) [visa se-
curity] functions may recommend to the chief 
of the consular section or the most senior su-
pervisory consular officer present that a visa 
be refused or revoked. If the chief of section 
or supervisory consular officer does not agree 
that the visa should be refused or revoked, 
the post will initiate a request for a security 
or other advisory opinion [SAO] and the DHS 
9 
employee will be consulted in its prepara-
tion. 
MOU, supra, at 11; cf. U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Office, GAO-11-315, DHS’s Visa Security Program 
[VSP] Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and 
Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide 15 (2011) (“VSP 
and consular interaction has been difficult at some 
posts, and ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment] has provided limited guidance for such interac-
tion.”). Amici were keenly aware during their service 
that questioning the national-security basis provided 
by other agencies for visa denials would not be well 
received either by those agencies or their own superi-
ors in the Department of State.  
 The process described in the MOU requires 
consular officers to refer “selected visa cases for 
greater review by intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies.” Wasem, supra, at 10. These Security 
Advisory Opinions (SAOs) place further constraints 
on consular decision-making, involving the FBI and 
other counterterrorism agencies, as described below. 
The MOU provides that “[c]ases in which a third 
agency to which such an SAO request is referred 
believes that denial of a visa is appropriate and 
DOS believes the information is legally insufficient 
will be referred to the Secretary of Homeland Securi-
ty to decide whether the facts support denial of the 
visa in accordance with law.” MOU, supra, at 7 (em-
phasis added). In such cases, whatever discretion the 
consular officer might wish to exercise is counter-
manded, and the officer ultimately issues a decision 
10 
that may not be based on his or her independent 
judgment. Consular officers are not law enforcement 
officials or equipped to investigate and evaluate all 
adverse data that may be included in databases or 
watchlists by other agencies. Consuls do, however, on 
occasion encounter cases where the rationale for a 
security-based denial does not seem rational or 
persuasive.  
 In short, only by omitting the new reality of visa 
decision-making can Petitioners assert that judicial 
review in cases like this one challenges whether “the 
consular officer reached an erroneous decision,” 
Petitioners’ Brief, 53 (emphasis added). In fact, that 
decision often is the product of information the consu-
lar officer has never seen, much less exercised discre-
tion in evaluating, as the next section illustrates 
through a real-life example. When evaluating judicial 
reviewability in terms of “the exercise of the consular 
officer’s responsibilities,” id., therefore, the Court is 
faced with a much more diffuse set of information 
inputs – and final authority reassigned by the Home-
land Security Act to DHS – than the traditional 
picture of consular visa processing Petitioners convey. 
   
11 
II. Judicial review is a necessary safety-
valve for visa denials relying on data-
bases and watchlists that are compiled 
with variable reliability by multiple agen-
cies, several of which have no authority 
over visa decisions. 
 Computers have revolutionized how information 
is stored and used. This now-obvious point obscures a 
subtler shift worked by the information revolution. 
Decisions once made by consular officers “at far-off 
posts,” Petitioners’ Brief, 15, based on their inde-
pendent evaluation and judgment, now increasingly 
rely on databases and watchlists maintained by 
distant officials based in the United States. The 
underlying standards used to compile these lists 
frequently remain unknown to the end-user, who 
nonetheless relies on their imposed labels. When a 
consular officer abroad denies a visa because the 
applicant’s name appears in a watchlist curated in 
Washington, D.C. by DHS, the FBI, or a third agency, 
such watchlist “hits” substitute for independent 
consular decision-making. Even databases run by the 
State Department are infused with information 
vetted (and labeled with threat designations) by 
outside officials neither trained nor authorized to 
make visa decisions.  
 The perception among consular officers like 
Amici is that serious questioning by a consul of 
national-security-based visa-denial information 
provided by another agency is essentially futile. 
Indeed, the State Department instructs that where a 
12 
DHS-generated basis for inadmissibility is discovered 
in the Consular Lookout and Support System 
(CLASS), the consular officer “must assume that the 
finding was correct” and, except in cases involving 
nonpermanent ineligibilities, “should not look behind 
a definitive DHS finding or re-adjudicate the alien’s 
eligibility with respect to the provision.” U.S. Dep’t of 
State Cable, 05-State-066722, Processing Cases with 
CLASS Hits ¶¶7-8 (Apr. 12, 2005), published on AILA 
InfoNet at Doc. No. 05052060; 9 Foreign Affairs 
Manual (FAM) 40.6 N.3.2. 
 When considering whether courts should review 
“why the consular officer decided that [a particular 
inadmissibility] provision was applicable,” Petition-
ers’ Brief, 52, it is therefore vital to understand where 
“information in the government’s hands,” id., origi-
nated, and to keep in mind that the consular officer 
himself or herself may well have no idea of the infor-
mation’s content or reliability. 
 Consular officers have access to the biometric 
and biographic Consular Consolidated Database 
(CCD), which contains more than 143 million visa 
application records; in 2012, the database also in-
cluded more than 109 million photographs which are 
used for facial recognition. Eleven Years Later: Pre-
venting Terrorists from Coming to America: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Securi-
ty of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th 
Cong. 31-32 (2012) (statement of Edward J. 
Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Visas). This database links with others controlled by 
13 
DHS and the FBI that are created for purposes other 
than visa processing.3 DOS also uses CLASS, report-
ed in 2012 to contain more than 42.5 million records, 
see Wasem, supra, at 9, including those of 27 million 
persons found ineligible for visas or against whom 
potentially derogatory information exists. Ramotowski, 
Eleven Years Later, supra, at 31. “Almost 70 percent 
of CLASS records come from other agencies, including 
information from the FBI, DHS, DEA, and intelli-
gence from other agencies.” Id. 
 A second layer of visa security, mentioned above 
in the context of VSU personnel, is provided by DHS 
databases to which consular officers do not have 
access. A third layer comes into play when a case is 
screened for terrorism-related inadmissibility pur-
poses. Starting in June 2013, interagency counterter-
rorism screening applies to all visa applicants. See 
Border Security Oversight, Part III: Border Crossing 
Cards and B1/B2 Visas: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
 
 3 “[D]atabases linked with the CCD include DHS’s Auto-
mated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (IAFIS) results, and supporting docu-
ments. In addition to performing biometric checks of the finger-
prints for all visa applicants, DOS uses facial recognition 
technology to screen visa applicants against a watchlist of 
photos of known and suspected terrorists obtained from the 
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), as well as the entire gallery of 
visa applicant photos contained in the CCD. The CCD also links 
to the DHS’s Traveler Enforcement Compliance System (TECS), 
a substantial database of law enforcement and border inspection 
information. . . .” Wasem, supra, at 6. 
14 
on National Security of the H. Comm. on Oversight 
and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 43 (2013) 
(statement of Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Visa Services). In 2009, the 
time period relevant to Mr. Berashk’s case, select 
cases referred for a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) 
received specialized screening, drawing on the federal 
government’s terrorism databases and watchlists.  
 The creation of such databases, and the disper-
sion of authority that they hide, began more than a 
decade after the era of consul-centered decision-
making that the Petitioners describe, see Petitioners’ 
Brief, 15; see also id. at 34, 40, and that the Court 
considered in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 
(1972). The first terrorist watchlist was designed by a 
State Department employee in 1987. It was a set of 3 
x 5 notecards kept in a shoebox, which quickly grew 
into a computerized system called TIPOFF, the direct 
progenitor of CLASS. See Jeffrey Kahn, MRS. SHIPLEY’S 
GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND TERRORIST WATCHLISTS 
10 (2013). As computer technology advanced, databases 
and watchlists proliferated. Id. at 135. 
 All of these systems suffered from the unwilling-
ness of stove-piped federal agencies to share infor-
mation. TIPOFF relied mainly on State Department 
sources for its biographical and derogatory infor-
mation; other agencies’ contributions were thin.4 The 
 
 4 Thomas R. Eldridge, et al., 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
(Continued on following page) 
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9/11 Commission criticized this “culture of agencies 
feeling they owned the information they gathered,” 
and recommended reforms “to bring the major na-
tional security institutions into the information 
revolution.” The 9/11 Commission Report: Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States 417-18 (2004). 
 As a result, two new agencies were created to 
centralize control of information. One, the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), was designed “to 
merge and analyze all threat information in a single 
location.” 149 Cong. Rec. 2033, 2035-36 (Jan. 28, 
2003) (State of the Union Address of President 
George W. Bush). The second, the Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC), was created to make, control, and 
distribute to other agencies the terrorist watchlists 
constructed from that information. Kahn, supra, at 
149.  
 The TSC is a component of the FBI, staffed by 
employees from many different agencies who operate 
under FBI leadership. Id. at 148; U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Management of 
Terrorist Watchlist Nominations 29 n.62 (Mar. 2014). 
 
United States 80 (2004) (“In 2001, the CIA provided 1,527 source 
documents to TIPOFF; the State Department, 2,013; the INS, 
173. The FBI, during this same year, provided 63 documents to 
TIPOFF – fewer than were obtained from the public media, and 
about the same number as were provided by the Australian 
Intelligence Agency (52).”). 
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Unlike the NCTC, the TSC operates solely under the 
authority of presidential directives.5 It does not 
provide direct administrative access or remedies to 
individuals. Kahn, supra, at 189.6  
 The TSC assembles and curates the Terrorist 
Screening Database (TSDB), an unclassified but law-
enforcement-sensitive database that is comprised of 
terrorist-related information submitted primarily by 
the NCTC and the FBI. Information in the TSDB is 
what the TSC uses to create and supply watchlists for 
other federal agencies, such as the No Fly List 
(Transportation Security Administration (TSA)) and 
CLASS. The TSC also coordinates interaction be-
tween agencies using its watchlists and the original 
information sources used to compose them. The TSDB 
thus sits at the center of what one district court 
 
 5 See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11 
§ 2 (Aug. 21, 2008) (“The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), 
which was established and is administered by the Attorney 
General pursuant to [Homeland Security Presidential Directive] 
6, enables Government officials to check individuals against a 
consolidated Terrorist Screening Center Database.”). The NCTC, 
by contrast, was established by Executive Order No. 13,354, 69 
Fed. Reg. 53589 (Sept. 1, 2004), and later authorized by statute. 
See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. 108-458, § 1021, 118 Stat. 3638, 3672-75. 
 6 See also Declaration of Christopher M. Piehota at 15 n.11, 
Latif v. Holder, No. 10-cv-00750-BR (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2010), ECF 
No. 44 (“The TSC does not accept redress inquiries directly from 
the public, nor does it respond directly to redress inquiries.”). 
Mr. Piehota is currently director of the Terrorist Screening 
Center; at the time of his declaration, he was Deputy Director 
for Operations. 
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called the government’s “web of interlocking watch-
lists.” Ibrahim v. DHS, No. 06-cv-00545-WHA, 2014 
WL 6609111, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).  
 The criteria for inclusion in the TSDB are rudi-
mentary: “at least a partial name (e.g., given name, 
surname, or both) and at least one additional piece of 
identifying information (e.g., date of birth),” and some 
“evidence of a nexus to terrorism.” U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-up 
Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center 3 n.23 (2007). 
What constitutes such a nexus is minimally defined. 
As one TSC director apprised auditors, “to err on the 
side of caution, individuals with any degree of a 
terrorism nexus were included” in the TSDB if the 
minimum necessary biographical data were available. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 
Review of the Terrorist Screening Center viii (2005). A 
later TSC director oversaw the development of a 
standard for inclusion, adapting the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). DOJ OIG Report (Mar. 2014), supra, at 3, 7.7 
Notably, however, this standard is itself subject to 
secret exception. Ibrahim, 2014 WL 6609111, at *12. 
 
 7 See also Kahn, supra, at 158 (citing author’s interview 
with TSC Director Timothy J. Healy and TSC General Counsel 
Jacqueline F. Brown (Dec. 4, 2009)), 302 n.10 (quoting from FBI 
Memorandum, Counterterrorism Program Guidance Watchlisting 
Administrative and Operational Guidance (Dec. 21, 2010)). 
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 As a result, the TSDB is enormous. In 2009, the 
TSDB contained the names of roughly 400,000 peo-
ple.8 It is certainly much larger now.9 
 Government oversight agencies have repeatedly 
found fault with TSDB’s maintenance. The FBI 
Inspector General’s most recent report concluded that 
the FBI “maintained redundant and inefficient pro-
cesses which hampered its ability to process watchlist 
actions in a more timely manner,” including failures 
to ensure that subjects of closed investigations are 
removed from the TSDB. See DOJ OIG Report (Mar. 
2014), supra, at 33. These findings followed previous 
audits that identified “significant weaknesses with 
the FBI’s management of the terrorist watchlist.” Id. 
at 34.  
 
 8 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Watchlist Nomination 
Practices 1 n.40 (2009); Five Years After the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act: Stopping Terrorist Travel: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmen-
tal Affairs, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Timothy J. 
Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center). 
 9 Neither the TSC nor the DOJ Office of the Inspector 
General has released a more recent statistic. However, the 
National Counterterrorism Center that maintains the TIDE 
system (from which most TSDB records are obtained) recently 
noted: “As of December 2013, TIDE contained about 1.1 million 
persons, most containing multiple minor spelling variations of 
their names.” NCTC, Terrorist Identities Datamart Environ-
ment Factsheet (Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.nctc.gov/ 
docs/tidefactsheet_aug12014.pdf. 
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 The Inspector General concluded that “the FBI is 
unable to ensure that all individuals that were nomi-
nated to the watchlist are appropriately removed 
when cases are closed.” Id. at 56. Previous audits also 
found high rates of error.10 
 These problems were all on display in Ibrahim v. 
DHS.11 Ibrahim is the first, and so far only, bench 
trial concerning terrorist watchlists.12 In January 
2014, the court ordered substantial remedial 
measures for all U.S. terrorist watchlists to correct 
their erroneous inclusion of Rahinah Ibrahim. The 
government did not appeal the district court’s judg-
ment for the plaintiff, Dr. Ibrahim.  
 Dr. Ibrahim, a Malaysian national, lawfully 
entered the United States in 1983 to study architec-
ture. She married, gave birth to a daughter, and after 
a decade back in Malaysia was completing doctoral 
 
 10 A DOJ Inspector General report issued in May 2009 
concluded that “78 percent of the sampled investigations were 
not processed within FBI guidelines. In 67 percent of the cases 
reviewed the case agent failed to modify the watchlist record 
when required by policy, and in 8 percent of the cases reviewed 
the FBI failed to remove subjects from the watchlist as required 
by policy. In 72 percent of closed cases the FBI failed to remove 
the subject in a timely manner.” Id. at 87 (summarizing report). 
 11 Undersigned counsel Jeffrey Kahn testified as an expert 
witness for the plaintiff in this case.  
 12 Other cases have proceeded based on stipulations agreed 
between the parties concerning factual allegations. Consequent-
ly, no other court has made findings of fact concerning allega-
tions raised in complaints about terrorist watchlists. See, e.g., 
Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1298 n.3 (D. Or. 2013). 
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work at Stanford University in 2005 when she at-
tempted to travel to an international academic con-
ference. After arriving with her fourteen-year-old 
daughter at a San Francisco airport check-in counter, 
and requesting a wheelchair, she was arrested, hand-
cuffed, and transported to an airport jail. Ibrahim, 
2014 WL 6609111, at *6. Although allowed to travel 
the next day, Dr. Ibrahim learned a few months later 
that her student visa had been revoked. Id. at *7.  
 The direct cause of what the district court de-
scribed as “the humiliation, cuffing, and incarceration 
of an innocent and incapacitated air traveler,” id. 
at *16, was an FBI agent. Agent Kelley nominated 
Dr. Ibrahim to the TSDB and to several terrorist 
watchlists about a month before they met at an 
interview he requested. Id. at *5, *6. Dr. Ibrahim’s 
nomination to these watchlists happened, Agent 
Kelley admitted, because he incorrectly completed a 
form used for watchlist nominations. Id. at *5. The 
district court described the agent’s mistake as the 
“bureaucratic analogy to a surgeon amputating the 
wrong digit.” Id. at *16. 
 As a result, Dr. Ibrahim’s name began to ricochet 
across various terrorism watchlists in “Kafkaesque 
on-off-on-list treatment.” Id. at *18. This despite the 
fact, conceded by the government, that Dr. Ibrahim is 
not and was not a threat to U.S. national security. Id. 
at *5, *19. The district court concluded that “suspi-
cious adverse effects continued to haunt Dr. Ibrahim 
in 2005 and 2006, even though the government 
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claims to have learned of and corrected the mistake.” 
Id. at *17. 
 Dr. Ibrahim received no explanation for these 
actions; as noted, the TSC does not accept or respond 
to public inquiries.13 Although Dr. Ibrahim’s name 
was removed from the No Fly List shortly after her 
arrest, her name remained on the TSDB, from which 
it was added to the CLASS watchlist. Id. at *10. 
 Following Dr. Ibrahim’s erroneous watchlist 
nomination, her F-1 student visa was revoked. Al-
though the certificate of revocation noted that “infor-
mation has come to light” indicating Dr. Ibrahim’s 
possible ineligibility for her visa, id. at *10, the trial 
record did not identify what that could be. Instead, 
two e-mail exchanges revealed how the FBI agent’s 
mistake ended up as the basis for revoking Dr. Ibra-
him’s visa; the consular officials responsible for 
handling her case neither contacted him nor knew 
why he nominated Dr. Ibrahim to the TSDB. Instead, 
the consular officials accepted the conclusion made by 
unknown TSC employees (who processed the un-
known FBI agent’s nomination), as a proxy for their 
own decision-making.  
 
 13 Complaints about the No Fly List through the DHS TRIP 
(Traveler Redress Inquiry Program) do not go directly to the 
TSC, but to DHS. It is unclear how many traveler complaints 
are forwarded from DHS to TSC, but this forwarding occurs only 
for positive matches to watchlists created by TSC for use by 
DHS component agencies (such as the No Fly List created for 
TSA). See Kahn, supra, at 191-92. 
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 The first e-mail was sent the day after Dr. Ibra-
him’s arrest. Officials in the coordination division of 
the State Department’s visa office discussed their 
frustration with a “stack of pending revocations” that 
included Dr. Ibrahim’s: 
I have a stack of pending revocations that 
are based on VGTO [the FBI’s Violent Gang 
and Terrorist Organization office] entries. 
These revocations contain virtually no de-
rogatory information. After a long and frus-
trating game of phone tag with INR [the 
Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research], TSC, and Steve Naugle of the 
FBI’s VGTO office, finally we’re going to re-
voke them. 
Per my conversation with Steve, there is no 
practical way to determine what the basis of 
the investigation is for these applicants. The 
only way to do it would be to contact the case 
agent for each case individually to determine 
what the basis of the investigation is. Since 
we don’t have the time to do that (and, in my 
experience, case agents don’t call you back 
promptly, if at all), we will accept that the 
opening of an investigation itself is a prima 
facie indicator of potential ineligibility under 
3(B) [Immigration and Nationality Act, Sec-
tion 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)]. 
Id. at *10 (emphasis in original). 
 The second e-mail, dated a month later, was sent 
by an employee in the State Department’s visa office 
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coordination division to the chief of the consular 
section of the U.S. embassy in Malaysia: 
The short version is that [Dr. Ibrahim’s] visa 
was revoked because there is law enforce-
ment interest in her as a potential terrorist. 
This is sufficient to prudentially revoke a vi-
sa but doesn’t constitute a finding of ineligi-
bility. The idea is to revoke first and resolve 
the issues later in the context of a new visa 
application. . . . My guess based on past ex-
perience is that she’s probably issuable. 
However, there’s no way to be sure without 
putting her through the interagency process. 
I’ll gin up the revocation. 
Id. at *11. 
 The “law enforcement interest” was Agent Kel-
ley’s incorrect nomination form. Once entered into the 
watchlisting system, Dr. Ibrahim’s name was snared 
by the “web of interlocking watchlists.” Id. at *7. This 
continued despite the submission, a year later, of a 
request by an unidentified government agent that her 
name be “Remove[d] From ALL Watchlisting Sup-
ported Systems (For terrorist subjects: due to closure 
of case AND no nexus to terrorism).” Id. at *11.  
 Ibrahim exposes two problems with databases 
and watchlisting that directly affect visa decisions.  
 First, databases and watchlists have in some 
regular instances displaced the traditional role of 
consular officers in visa adjudications. A single FBI 
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agent submitting a wrongly completed watchlist-
nomination form led to Dr. Ibrahim’s addition to the 
No Fly List and the revocation of her student visa. 
DOS consular officials deferred entirely to watchlists 
created by officials from another agency based on 
information from an inaccessible FBI agent. In Ami-
ci’s experience, this example typifies the post-
Homeland Security Act era. The FBI’s information 
sources were unknown to the consular officials re-
sponsible for communicating a final visa determina-
tion to Dr. Ibrahim.  
 Second, errors reverberate through the 
watchlisting system undetected or, worse, impervious 
to attempts to purge them. As the district court in 
Ibrahim commented: “Once derogatory information is 
posted to the TSDB, it can propagate extensively 
through the government’s interlocking complex of 
databases, like a bad credit report that will never go 
away.” Id. at *16. With specific reference to CLASS, 
the court added that “bad information may remain 
there and may linger on there” even if the original 
entry in the TSDB is corrected or changed. Id. at *17. 
DOS maintains its files, linked to past and present 
CLASS entries, “until the applicant reaches age 
ninety and has no visa application within the past ten 
years.” Id. at *10. 
 Judicial review is therefore an essential protec-
tion to prevent visa denials based on erroneous 
information. The mistake in Dr. Ibrahim’s case went 
undetected until disclosed in a deposition ordered by 
the district court, over government opposition, three 
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months before trial. See Omnibus Order on Pending 
Motions at 14, Ibrahim v. DHS, No. 06-cv-00545-
WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013), ECF No. 532; De-
fendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Contin-
uance [Redacted] at 2, id. (Aug. 7, 2013), ECF No. 
520. Her case – nearly eight years of litigation – 
revealed what others refused visas lack the resources 
and perseverance to expose: the inherent weaknesses 
and flaws in the new visa-security system. None of 
the remedial audits or other mechanisms for self-
correction undertaken by the TSC and its customer 
agencies uncovered the error on which so many 
official actions were based. 
 The use today of numerous databases and 
watchlists for visa decisions explains why the DHS 
Inspector General described interagency security 
vetting as leading to decisions often dictated to DOS, 
rather than made using consular discretion: “After 
conducting their review, the respective agencies in-
form DOS whether the applicant is eligible for a visa.” 
DHS Visa Security, supra, at 7 (emphasis added). 
This is a world apart from the traditional exercise of 
consular discretion. 
 Indeed, there is no reasonable opportunity for 
consular officers to exercise consular discretion once 
a barrier to visa approval is erected by another 
agency. Denials occur regardless of whether the 
consular officer is completely in the dark about the 
rationale (and regardless of whether the consular 
officer might possess or become aware of information 
that might mitigate or disprove inadmissibility, or 
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could contribute to a fruitful line of inquiry to reach 
that conclusion). In fact, DHS decisions in the U.S., 
based on TSC watchlists, on occasion override the 
judgment of consular officers at far-off posts. Judicial 
review for mistakes is imperative to ensure that 
modern technology-driven visa processing does not 
sweep aside American values of fairness and accura-
cy, shattering family unity. 
 
III. The Court should hold that judicial re-
view of visa denials is available where 
there was no actual, legitimate exercise of 
consular discretion. 
 As then-Circuit Judge Ginsburg underscored, 
“[t]he Executive has broad discretion over the admis-
sion and exclusion of aliens, but that discretion is not 
boundless. It extends only as far as the statutory 
authority conferred by Congress and may not trans-
gress constitutional limitations. It is the duty of the 
courts, in cases properly before them, to say where 
those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.” 
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). The Court of Appeals in this case correctly 
required the government to provide more information 
regarding Mr. Berashk’s visa denial, in order to 
ensure that the denial was lawful. 
 While the exercise of consular discretion should 
ordinarily receive appropriate deference, cf. 
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. 753, judicial review should be 
available to examine claims that a visa applicant was 
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incorrectly deemed inadmissible using information 
beyond the purview of properly exercised consular 
discretion. Drawing the line in this fashion would 
greatly restrict the number of cases brought to feder-
al court. Contrary to the Petitioners’ concern that all 
112,405 visa applications denied under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a) in fiscal year 2013 would end up being 
reviewed, see Petitioners’ Brief, 31 n.10, DOS statis-
tics indicate that visa denials susceptible to searching 
judicial review would constitute a far smaller subset. 
For example, only 28 immigrant-visa refusals under 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) – the ground used to exclude 
Mr. Berashk – were issued during fiscal year 2013.14 
In each of those cases, if the inadmissibility ground(s) 
could be overcome there is a statutory right for the 
applicant to be issued an immigrant visa. 
 In this case, Ms. Din deserves a judicial account-
ing of whether a specific statutory ground of inadmis-
sibility was properly applied to deny Mr. Berashk’s 
immigrant-visa application. This is particularly so 
because, as the government recognizes, “numerous 
 
 14 U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa 
Ineligibilities: Fiscal Year 2013, available at http://travel.state.gov/ 
content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2013AnnualReport/ 
FY13AnnualReport-TableXX.pdf. None of the 28 ineligibility 
findings for immigrant visas is listed as having been overcome. 
There were also 591 non-immigrant visa ineligibility findings 
based on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) in fiscal year 2013, 352 of 
which were overcome. This may indicate a high error rate in the 
initial findings which are then corrected, to some extent through 
a waiver process available to certain non-immigrants (but not to 
immigrants) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i). 
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provisions of the INA reflect a concern for promoting 
family unity among U.S. citizens and their undocu-
mented families.” Defendants’ Opposition to Plain-
tiff ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 43, Texas v. 
United States, No. 14-CV-254 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 
2014), ECF No. 38 (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 
(1966), and giving as an example 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (placing no limits on number of 
immigrant visas available for parents of U.S. citizens 
older than 21)). 
 The mission of consular officers officially includes 
“[h]elping U.S. citizens with family reunification.” 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Career Tracks for Foreign Service 
Officers, available at http://careers.state.gov/work/ 
foreign-service/officer/career-tracks. Moreover, given 
the serious delays that loss of a priority date cause for 
many immigrant-visa applications, careful review of 
denials that are not based on the actual, legitimate 
exercise of consular discretion is all the more neces-
sary to ensure family unity for U.S. citizens in quali-
fying cases. Amici believe that visa decisions issued 
by consular officers, the bread and butter of our long 
careers, have consequences of a magnitude that 
warrants judicial error-correction in an appropriate 
subset of cases. For these reasons Amici respectfully 
request that this Court preserve reviewability of 
those visa denials. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSION 
 Amici respectfully urge the Court to affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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